This article provides a case study of a project in Kondoa, Tanzania under the program Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD). It demonstrates how a success narrative came to dominate presentations about the project as a multi-win involving not only climate change mitigation and biodiversity conservation, but also benefits for local people and poverty reduction. Based on repeated fieldwork using qualitative methods, we find that there is lack of evidence to substantiate the success claims. These claims are in particular based on the assertion that a component of "conservation agriculture" was successfully implemented as compensation for forest enclosure. Gaps between claims and evidence are often exhibited in the scholarship on political ecologies of conservation in Africa, as well as by observers of development aid projects. But how can such gaps be explained? We suggest taking the interests of the actors behind the project as a point of departure including how individuals as well as organisations have stakes in marketing a success narrative. Furthermore, we argue that an unsubstantiated success narrative of an aid project can be maintained only when there is a lack of structures to ensure independent and adequate examinations of the project by evaluators and researchers. In this case, Norway was the funder of the project, and as the dominant funder of REDD, the Norwegian government has a particular interest in reproducing REDD success narratives, since the credibility of the country's climate mitigation policy depends on REDD being a success. In addition, the case study demonstrates how "success projects" emerge in the wake of new development fads. At the conference in Bali, then-Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg stated:
At the conference in Bali, then-Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg stated:
"Through effective measures against deforestation we can achieve large cuts in greenhouse gas emissions -quickly and at low cost. The technology is well known and has been available for thousands of years. Everybody knows how not to cut down a tree" 4 .
As an economist himself who seeks cost-effictiveness, and as a leader of an oilproducing nation, Mr Stoltenberg and the statement above may be seen to represent the crux of the approach of addressing climate change through reducing deforestation. In fact, Norway's climate change mitigation policy has since the late 1980s been based on the principle of international cost-effectiveness 5 . This implies that it is seen more cost-effective to mitigate climate change in a low-cost country, rather than in an expensive country like Norway. Forest conservation has come to play a leading role in Norway's approach to mitigation in low-cost countries.
Deforestation in Tanzania is usually attributed to expansion of agricultural land 6 , charcoal trade 7 and timber exploitation 8 . The official deforestation rate in the country was 1.1% per year from 2005 to 2010 9 .
Since the inception of REDD in 2007, a plethora of studies have been initiated to examine its results. For instance, a search in Google Scholar in mid-December 2015 gave almost 4500 hits on "REDD". The peer-reviewed literature on REDD in Tanzania is, however, still quite limited in quantity and also spreads over a number of themes. Several of these studies discuss implications for REDD rather than observed results 10 . Some of these focus on the policy formulation process and institutional design 11 , some on tenure issues 12 , while Beymer-Farris and Bassett sparked a controversy arguing that making a forest REDD-ready may lead to injustice and dispossession of forest-dependent communities by shifting resource control from local to global actors 13 . Furthermore, in line with our own argument, based on long-term research on forest conservation in Tanzania, Lund et al. conclude that REDD is another "conservation fad" in which success becomes a discursive commodity that is converted into financial resources by leading actors. In a similar vein, Koch 14 , also discussing the case of REDD in Tanzania, focuses on the role of aid experts in producing these fads.
In fact, Tanzania is one of the first countries to have drafted a national REDD strategy 15 . This strategy lays out key principles on how the country will approach REDD both technically and institutionally, and it presents Participatory Forest Management (PFM) as a model that REDD may build upon. PFM was adopted in Tanzania in the early 1990s to achieve sustainable forest management by encouraging co-management of forest resources between the state and communities adjacent to forests. The significance of PFM for sustainable forest management has also been noted in the National Framework for REDD 16 .
The UN-REDD programme has developed social and environmental principles and criteria containing seven principles and 24 criteria. Principle 3 aims to promote sustainable livelihoods and poverty reduction, and according to Criterion 13, economic and social well-being of relevant stakeholders are to be protected and enhanced, with special attention to the most vulnerable and marginalised groups 17 . As stated in a UN-REDD policy brief, such safeguards "can help to ensure that REDD activities 'do no harm' to people or the environment" 18 .
Under Norway's NICFI funding to Tanzania, there was an emphasis on pilot projects facilitated by international and national NGOs. We here present findings from a case study of one of the nine pilot projects. Located in Kondoa District in Dodoma Region, the project was carried out from the beginning of 2010 to the end of 2014 by the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF). The main focus of the project was to implement a strict regime of conservation of the forests of Kondoa-Irangi Hills 19 .
In order to compensate for lost access to the forests and finance conservation, the project's objective was to prepare for participation in carbon markets 20 , and furthermore to obtain certification for selling carbon credits. In April 2015 the project idea note was approved by the carbon-offset foundation Plan Vivo 21 .
In addition, the REDD project aimed to provide livelihood alternatives and thereby reduce poverty. An agricultural component has from an early stage of the project been presented as particularly successful and a key to the overall success of the project. According to the project proposal and the contract with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the goal of the project was "to contribute to poverty reduction and climate change mitigation by enhancing Tanzania's capacity to use REDD as a mechanism for rural communities to reap tangible benefits from improved forest management and conservation" 22 . Thus, the goals were in line with safeguard Criterion 13 by UN-REDD.
In this article we discuss whether or not it can be substantiated that the agricultural component of the project has been implemented in a way that has resulted in the REDD project reaching the aims of "no harm" and poverty reduction for villagers in the period after the forest enclosure. If the project can be seen as having caused no harm to people, there must be evidence showing that the livelihood components compensate for the livelihood losses of the villagers, and particularly for those who may be seen as vulnerable and marginalised. Furthermore, if it can be concluded that the project has provided poverty reduction, the economic and social well-being of the villagers will not only have been protected, but also enhanced, even for the most vulnerable and marginalised groups. The Norwegian embassy in Tanzania and AWF have highlighted the agricultural livelihood component as particularly successful, and this success has been used to legitimise Norwegian support to REDD in Tanzania. We investigate this alleged success, and we are especially concerned about evidence of the total effects of the enclosure of the forest on the most vulnerable and marginalised groups, and to what extent the agricultural component has been able to compensate for the immediate losses associated with forest conservation.
To compensate for lost forest access, the project also included the following livelihood elements: Improved cooking stoves, sustainable charcoal production, energy-efficient brick production, and tree planting. Since the actors behind the REDD project have focused mainly on the agricultural component in their success narrative of the project, we assume they see this component as considerably more successful than the other elements. We also observed ourselves that these other livelihood elements were rather modest in their implementation in the project area. Furthermore, we have not found evidence or even indications in project documents that the other livelihood elements come close to compensating for lost forest access. Thus, in this article we focus on the agricultural component as the main form of compensation produced by this REDD project.
The project also contained elements intended to contribute to economic benefits for people in the future. There was assistance for land use planning in the villages, and there was preparations for sale of carbon credits. The impacts of these activities are, however, not discussed in this article.
The article contributes to the literature on social consequences of REDD in particular and of conservation interventions and development aid more broadly. The Norwegian government has, as a powerful REDD actor, argued throughout the project period that this project represents an especially good example of the social benefits accruing to local communities from REDD initiatives.
This case can therefore be seen as a "crucial case" 23 , which "must closely fit a theory if one is to have confidence in the theory's validity". In other words, if REDD projects generally tend to alleviate poverty and do no harm, such an outcome should be expected in this particular case as it is repeatedly highlighted as a success story by the Norwegian government that remains the dominant international actor on REDD.
Since this case and the agricultural component in particular have been used to promote Norwegian support to REDD in Tanzania and elsewhere, this is also an interesting and important case to study in itself.
As we shall see, the production of certain knowledge claims from this case by officials from the Norwegian embassy and AWF on websites, in reports and seminars and in presentations to Norwegian parliamentarians, reproduce a success narrative that is in sharp contrast to our findings. Interestingly, embassy officials repeating this narrative have never or very briefly visited the project area. In line with Norway's policy of recipient responsibility, this lack of hands on approach is how the embassy operates 24 . Also external consultants reproduce this narrative based on short or no field visits.
The study is also in line with conclusions from the political ecology scholarship on conservation in Tanzania, which demonstrates that natural resource-dependent communities tend to pay the costs of conservation 25 . At the same time, conservation projects and programmes continue to be presented as great win-win success stories by the most influential actors, which illustrates a general gap between conservation discourse and practices in Tanzania and other African countries 26 .
Our research was based on the use of qualitative methods during 2011-2016 in Kondoa, Dar es Salaam and Arusha 27 . We also conducted archival studies at the Nordic Africa Institute in Uppsala on the history of environmental interventions in Kondoa. We recorded and transcribed all interviews except in some instances when interviewees did not accept such recording. The REDD project included 19 villages, and we conducted interviews, focus group discussions and observations in 14 of these, and for comparative purposes also in six other villages in the area.
We proceed by first presenting the background to the REDD project in the KondoaIrangi Hills. Thereafter we show how the forest enclosure in the project took place, before we examine the agricultural component and compare the success narrative to our own findings. Generally, we conclude that the benefits of the agricultural component have been grossly exaggerated, and that these benefits do not compensate for the negative livelihood effects of the enclosure of the forest. Marginalised villagers whose livelihoods are most at risk were also hardest affected by the forest enclosure, while they are least capable of benefitting from the rather costly and inputintensive agricultural approach introduced.
How is it possible that a success narrative can dominate in a project of conservation and development interventions when it is not supported by empirical evidence? We end by suggesting a way of explaining this. Following Mosse 28 , we take as a point of departure the interests of the main actors behind the project, and in this case these are first of all the facilitating NGO, AWF, and the Norwegian Embassy, as well as individuals in these organisations. Knowledge claims were produced about success, and following Chapin 29 and Büscher 30 , this production can be considered as a form of marketing according to how international corporations operate. The donor country should be expected to have structures in place to ensure independent and adequate examinations by evaluators and researchers. However, such structures were largely absent in this case, even though the project was among the pilots where learning presumably would be a key element. In line with Lund et al. 31 , the success narrative about the REDD project in Kondoa can be seen to contribute to a broader success discourse about REDD 32 as a key element of Norwegian climate mitigation policy.
Given this crucial role of REDD in Norwegian policy formulation, it may have been more tempting than usual for government officials to try to avoid critical examinations by evaluators and researchers.
Background to the Kondoa-Irangi Hills REDD project
In 2006, an evaluation report followed by a forensic audit concluded that there had been corruption and mismanagement in the Management of Natural Resources Programme supported by Norway through the Tanzanian Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism during 1994-2006. This programme amounted to NOK 300 million (about USD 35 million), and only half of it could be traced by the audits 33 . As a consequence, when the Norwegian government in 2008 announced its support to REDD in Tanzania with NOK 500 million (about USD 60 million), the Norwegians decided to use NGOs rather than the Tanzanian government as facilitators to implement nine pilot projects. Ironically, corruption was later discovered in two of these projects; one run by WWF and the other by the Wildlife Conservation Society of Tanzania. The facilitating NGOs, including the cases they proposed, were chosen after a tender process.
The AWF, suggesting implementation of a REDD project in the Kondoa-Irangi Hills, was responsible for one of the winning proposals. The organisation had selected this area because these hills constitute the water catchment area for Tarangire National Park, which belongs to one of AWF's eight priority landscapes in Africa (previously labelled "heartlands"), namely the Maasai Steppe. Through forest conservation, the project would secure a stable water supply for wildlife in Tarangire where water is scarce in the drier parts of the year. This pilot REDD project received funding of USD 2,472,757 for initially three years from January 2010, but the project period was later extended twice, and finally ended in December 2014.
The Kondoa-Irangi Hills consist of two forest reserves 34 in addition to some smaller village forests. In the project area there were 21 villages with about 62.000 people 35 (see Figure 1) . Fifteen of the villages border the two forest reserves, and village assemblies in two of them decided not to participate in the project. Thus, a total of 19 villages took part in the project.
A baseline survey was commissioned by AWF and conducted in 11 of the villages in February and November of 2010. On average, approximately 28% of the population was estimated to live in deep poverty with less than USD 1 per day, and this percentage was observed to vary in the investigated villages from 13% to 60% 36 .
The "poor" were found to have common characteristics such as illiteracy, possessing little farmland, not applying fertilizers, being dependent on providing casual labour for middle-income and well-off groups, being food-insecure, having difficulties with meeting basic needs, and many were involved in charcoal production. A middleincome group was identified as consisting of 61% of the villagers and a well-off group of 11%. However, an estimate of income per day for each of these groups was not provided. Many in the middle-income group might also be seen as poor 37 . Almost all the villagers were smallholding farmers. In the survey by Mung'ong'o et al.
(2011), crop cultivation was found to constitute the main economic activity (70.2% of the villagers), while 27.4% were agro-pastoralists. The Kondoa-Irangi Hills have had a long history of environmental interventions. Already in the German colonial period before World War I, European travellers reported about eroded forest landscapes with deep gullies 38 . These gullies were caused by soils naturally susceptible to erosion 39 . The area was, however, also infested with tsetse flies, and in 1927 the British colonial government initiated a campaign to eradicate tsetse through bush clearing. This campaign continued throughout the 1930s and 1940s 40 , and the clearing of vegetation further accelerated soil erosion. In the late 1940s, colonial concerns about erosion in the area led to the instigation of a soil conservation scheme in Kondoa 41 . Using communal labour, the agricultural department introduced contour ridges, rotational grazing, de-stocking and contour banks around fields. These measures also became linked to famine relief that frequently had to be imported to the district 42 . The colonial narrative on soil erosion in Kondoa displayed, however, a "remarkable lack of firm evidence concerning either when or how soil erosion began" 43 . Except for the contour ridges, there was local opposition to the scheme. This opposition formed part of a broader political resistance to colonisation leading eventually to the closing down of the soil conservation programme in the late 1950s 44 .
In the 1960s, political attention shifted to increasing agricultural production. Little attention was paid to conservation, and new land was cleared 45 . In 1969, President
Nyerere visited Kondoa and became concerned about the level of soil erosion that he observed 46 . This allegedly prompted him to "read a lesson to the Kondoa leaders" 47 .
The follow-up of this visit eventually led to the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism launching a soil conservation programme in the Dodoma region in 1973 (Mradi ya Hifadhi Ardhi Dodoma -HADO), which the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) decided to support financially. From 1973 to 1994, SIDA spent SEK 20 million (about USD 2.7 million) on HADO 48 . An area of 125,600 hectares around Kondoa town was to be protected from soil erosion. The work was seen by the HADO and district leadership to progress too slowly, and in 1979 it was therefore decided that all livestock should be evicted from the area. This strict measure apparently led to a recovery of the vegetation within few years 49 .
The HADO project was, however, generally not well received by people in the area. Open and hidden resistance included setting fire to the regeneration vegetation, illegal grazing and the opening up of new fields, and in 1983 a HADO official was killed while patrolling against illegal grazing 50 .
This historical background is important in order to understand the continuity of environmental interventions in Kondoa and how such interventions are received by villagers. Such "reactions from below" 51 can vary from forms of open and covert resistance to adaptation or compliance 52 . The villagers in Kondoa therefore have a long historical experience of relating to external environmental interventions and of using a range of these forms of reactions. Hence, when the Norwegian government funded its REDD project in the area from 2010, this initiative entered a particular historical context with contentious relations between villagers on the one hand, and the state and external actors on the other.
In interviews, villagers explained to us that during the HADO project, forest use was limited due to strict regulations and enforcement by HADO agents. When the Swedish funding dwindled in the first half of the 1990s, the presence of HADO agents in the villages decreased correspondingly, as did the policing of the forests. Hence, local forest use such as the gathering of firewood, livestock grazing, and the provision of building materials steadily increased again. In addition, some local charcoal making re-emerged. This situation changed again with the implementation of the REDD project from 2010.
Forest enclosure
The two forest reserves, Isabe and Salanga, have been enclosed as a result of this REDD pilot project. These forests had, in theory, been closed off for any use from adjacent villages already in the colonial period, in 1941 and 1954 respectively. In practice however, villagers used these forests extensively throughout the last decades of British colonialism as well as in the first decade after independence in 1961. Hence, until the 1970s, local use of the forests was in practice accepted by the government, despite the forests formally being reserves. During this period, even local government officials allegedly brought chainsaws to harvest timber in the forest. It was only during the HADO project from the early 1970s to the early 1990s that the forest was closed to local use.
The REDD project reintroduced some of the rules from the HADO period. These rules are based on bye-laws signed by the leaders of the 13 participating villages sharing boundaries with the two forest reserves 53 . In addition, some villages participated in the REDD project on the basis of conservation of their own small village forests. According to the rules, many activities are forbidden in the forests, such as hunting, farming, extraction of wood for charcoal production and timber. Besides, some activities are permitted upon payment of a fee, such as collection of dry firewood, cutting grass, grazing, collection of fruits, research, tourism, and visiting the forests. There are specified fines for infraction of the rules.
The bye-laws and management plans mandate a community-based organisation (JUHIBEKO) to manage the forest according to the rules and plan laid out. In each of the 13 villages, four village scouts were recruited for a joint troop to patrol the forests. Villagers caught without permits in the forests have been given fines that are relatively high compared to income. Some have also been imprisoned.
The restrictions imposed on forest resources have social consequences. We found three overlapping factors that by themselves and together play important roles in determining whether or not the forest enclosure causes extra hardship for villagers. First, people living close to the conserved forests and without alternative forested areas nearby tend to be more seriously affected than others. Second, villagers with relatively small farms or without farmland at all seem to be more affected than others. This is because many villagers who lack sufficient farmland depend more on forest resources to sustain a living, for instance by charcoal production. Third, women tend to be more affected than men, because of their roles in the gendered division of labour, and particularly with collecting firewood for domestic purposes.
For instance, a number of women we interviewed said that instead of paying a fee to collect firewood, they would rather go elsewhere to collect fuel for domestic use. They find the fee of TZS 1000 (about USD 0.45) to collect dry wood for three days too expensive. Some interviewees also said they did not understand why one had to pay to collect dry and dead wood.
The same problem applies to livestock owners who have through enclosure lost access to communal grazing areas. Out of desperation, however, some people still enter the forest with livestock. If they are caught, the fines received are extremely high compared to their level of income.
Finally, increased crop damage by wildlife, especially warthogs, is another result of forest enclosure mentioned by a number of interviewees. The main reason for the increase in some wildlife species seems to be that there are currently fewer people and less human activity in the forest than before enclosure. This provides an additional challenge for villagers living close to the forest.
Towards the end of the REDD project in 2014, the new restrictions on forest use seemed to have increased forest density and regrowth in the area. This impression was mentioned by several interviewees, although no systematic monitoring of the forest compared to a baseline has been carried out.
In the end of 2015 a new district council was elected, and the forest conservation regime established by the REDD project became an important topic in the election campaign. Most representatives who ended up being elected from the area were critical of the REDD project. During our fieldwork in Kondoa in December 2016, we found, as a consequence, that the management of the enclosed forest to a large extent had stopped functioning.
The agricultural component
In the following, we first show how the agricultural project component has been presented as exceptionally successful by both the Norwegian embassy and AWF. Thereafter, we deconstruct the success narrative by demonstrating that it lacks evidence and how the agricultural component was implemented with many delays and minimal extension support to farmers. In addition, we discovered that the agricultural component of the REDD project overlaps both with a government programme as well as with two other AWF projects. This means that the few benefits can only to a limited degree be seen as outcomes of the REDD project. Finally, we discuss the risks involved for smallholders of engaging with the input-intensive agricultural approach promoted by the REDD project.
The essence of the agricultural component was that 12 farmers in each of the 19 villages were appointed as "demonstration farmers". They received training in "improved farming methods" and agreed to make one acre of their farmland available as demonstration plots. On these plots, they were to apply the methods learned, and a central element was to use "improved seeds", chemical fertilisers and pesticides.
Furthermore, farmers were taught to change from inter-cropping to the alternation of two crops in every second row, and to use a rope to align plants in straight rows and with regular space in-between. On hill slopes, farmers were advised to place the rows along contours to reduce erosion during heavy rains. The intention was that other villagers should adapt this approach by following the examples of these demonstration farmers 54 .
In the REDD project, AWF used the label "conservation agriculture" for this farming approach. It is, however, in line with mainstream agricultural modernisation primarily aiming at increasing yields through adding external inputs. AWF introduced this as a way to reduce the pressure on forests: "the idea was to increase agricultural productivity, in order to reduce or control forest dependence" 55 . This differs substantially from FAO's established version of conservation agriculture aimed at more environmentally friendly conditions on the fields through reducing soil disturbance, maintaining soil cover and practising crop rotation 56 .
Moreover, AWF's introduction of conservation agriculture was a core element of their climate change mitigation project in Kondoa, although it also deviates substantially from FAO's notion of "climate smart agriculture". FAO has elaborated this notion by broadening its approach of conservation agriculture to specify elements to obtain adaptation and mitigation targets on the agricultural fields 57 . In Kondoa, however, the project aimed at climate change mitigation through forest conservation and not through reducing emissions from the agricultural fields.
Selian Agricultural Research Institute (SARI) is a governmental research institute that was subcontracted by AWF to facilitate the livelihood components. SARI provided two types of improved seeds for maize. Hybrid seeds were recommended for relatively wealthy farmers and an option of open pollinated varieties was suggested for resource-poor farmers. The maize hybrids came from Pannar and DuPont Pioneer (both owned by the American corporation DuPont), while the open pollinated varieties are bred and produced by Tanzanian research stations. There were also two alternatives of chemical fertilisers. The first was diammonium phosphate (DAP) bought from foreign producers, such as the Norwegian company Yara that dominates the Tanzanian market. The second was fertiliser products from Tanzanian companies such as Minjingu Fertilisers. Only commercial pesticides -without any low-cost alternative of integrated pest management -were provided 58 .
The agricultural component of the REDD project is to a large extent consistent with the green revolution approach that has been tried for a while in Tanzania and is still dominating within the state and among aid donors such as Norway (Bergius et al. 2017 ).
Claims of a successful agricultural component
Based on the implementation of the livelihood components, both the Norwegian embassy and AWF have repeatedly presented the project as successful, and the agricultural component has, in particular, been emphasised as key to this success. For instance, in a pamphlet on Norwegian development assistance to Tanzania, the Norwegian embassy focused extensively on presenting successes of the agricultural component and other aspects of the AWF project. Under the headline of "increasing food production to reduce emissions", the embassy argued that training of over 170 farmers has resulted in farmers producing "more food and income without expanding cultivated area. From demonstration farms, AWF showed in May 2011 that maize productivity increased eight times" 59 .
In the beginning of 2014, the embassy argued that the Kolo Hills project "has led to improved food security and livelihoods in general" 60 .
At the Norwegian embassy one year later, we were given accounts of a presentation held by the AWF director to a delegation of Norwegian Members of Parliament a few days earlier:
"He [the AWF Director] was talking about conservation and agriculture, how they had reached out and benefitted 20,000 farmers, primarily the poorer part of the population, and also that this led to increase of the farmers' yields. They use conservation agriculture, which is the concept promoted by the African Wildlife Foundation. This has boosted the productivity of the smallholders and thereby improving livelihoods." 61 In a number of interviews with AWF officials we were repeatedly told that the conservation agriculture component of the REDD project was exceptionally successful, and that many staff from other projects were visiting Kondoa to learn about conservation agriculture. AWF also told us that the REDD project has led to an increase in food production and therefore "the people who practice conservation agriculture are actually able to feed the rest of the population in the project villages. And the surplus has been taken not only outside the project area, but outside the district" 62 .
And when asking whether AWF was satisfied with project achievements relating to poverty reduction, we were told: "Yes, that one is very very clear … . Before the project, people were harvesting an average of 300 to 400 kilograms of maize for example per acre, but due to the intervention of the project in conservation agriculture, people are now harvesting up to eight times of that … . So that alone has improved livelihoods quite a lot" 63 .
"Why would one try to sell charcoal or go to the forest for any other business if they can have improved agriculture on their own land? … So everybody said 'wow'!" 64 .
AWF representatives also insisted in interviews that the REDD project in Kondoa was ahead of the other REDD pilot projects in the country on livelihood issues, mainly because of its successful component on conservation agriculture. In the final project report, claims of huge yield increases were repeated 65 .
Lacking evidence of success
Repeatedly, AWF officials referred to the large impact of the conservation agriculture component, with five, six or eight times increases in maize yields, and at least 1600 new farmers adopting the method annually. When we asked for documentation of these results, AWF referred us to the Norwegian embassy and the embassy referred us to AWF. Hence, it became clear that the success claims were not documented by systematic studies. At SARI, we were told that in an area as dry as Kondoa it would be impossible to get such high increases of yields as claimed by AWF and the Norwegian embassy. They had at the most recorded increases of maize yields of 2.6 times in this area, which was in an exceptional case in a village with more rainfall than most parts of Kondoa, and only among farmers who could afford hybrid seeds 66 .
When we asked AWF about the calculations behind the claim that 1600 farmers annually had adopted the agricultural approach, we were told:
"Actually, what takes place is that both our partner [SARI] and we go there. We make assessments, and we just compare it for reporting. So it was not like a study, but it is something that is continuous. When we go there every season, we get updates. When we visit a village we ask the demonstration farmers: 'How many have been copying from what you have been doing?' And they tell us that, and we go and visit them, and we confirm that it's true. … So it was just visits and collecting information in that way" 67 .
These claims are problematic for several reasons. First, some farmers might have tried out the approach during one or more farming season, which does not necessarily imply that they will continue to use the approach permanently. Second, there is lack of data specifying what various farmers have adopted. How many have adopted all the methods demonstrated, including hybrid seeds and chemical fertilisers? And how many have adopted various limited elements, including the use of ropes to make straight planting rows, ploughing along contour lines or using regular spacing between the plants? The method of cultivating along contour lines has, by the way, a long history in the area and was propagated already in the colonial time, as mentioned earlier. Third, villagers have had an interest in reporting about successful and widespread adoption of this technology, and project staff and researchers risk overreporting such adoption. This was demonstrated through a test distribution of carbon payments in 2013 that was part of the efforts to try to establish sales of carbon credits from the project. The funding each village could expect to receive from future carbon payments would to a large extent be a function of the degree to which villagers had adopted the demonstrated agricultural approach 68 . This context made it impossible to make a sound assessment of the degree of adoption of project methods in each village just by asking village leaders and demonstration farmers. For instance, one village chairman said about the twelve demonstration plots in his village:
"They have brought a lot of benefits to the village and it has made it possible for the villagers to stop going into the forest to get timber, charcoal and other things" 69 .
This chairman also gave us a calculation implying that more than 80% of the villagers had started using the farming methods introduced by the project. In the village "Kijiji 2", two of the 12 farmers involved with demonstration plots said that they thought about half of all households had adopted these farming methods.
Nevertheless, the large majority of the villagers we talked to were actually sceptical of the REDD project in general and about its agricultural component in particular. As shown below, they were generally dissatisfied with the implementation of the agricultural component, and believed that the promoted approach did not bring any substantial new additions to already known farming techniques. For instance, one of the villagers of "Kijiji 3" estimated that only 5-10% of the farmers could afford to buy the required inputs of seeds, fertilisers and pesticides.
Furthermore, in several villages, we discovered that when people told us that many farmers in their area had adopted the REDD project's farming recommendations, we found that they were referring to straight rows, contour ploughing and regular space between the plants. As mentioned, Kondoa has a long history of environmental and agricultural interventions including the propagation of cultivation along contour lines. So people using these techniques is hardly only a result of the REDD project. In "Kijiji 1" for instance, we asked a farmer how many in her sub-village she thought had started using the methods of the demonstration plots. This farmer was closely related to one of the demonstration farmers, and she seemed to be well informed. She answered: "Almost everybody". When we asked more specific questions, however, it became clear that she referred only to regular spacing between the plants, while farmers did generally not buy inputs such as seeds, fertilisers or pesticides.
Likewise, many farmers told us in the beginning of interviews that they had adopted the approach promoted by the REDD project, but when we asked specific questions about what they had adopted and checked their fields, we discovered that changes they referred to often were restricted to making rows and spaces. However, very few farmers interviewed seemed to have adopted the full approach with buying hybrid seeds, chemical fertilisers and pesticides.
The Norwegian embassy commissioned consultant companies to undertake two major evaluations of the REDD pilot projects. Deloitte carried out the mid-term reviews, and claimed that the Kondoa project "is one of the leading projects in the pilot portfolio and is well on its way to completing its goals and objectives" and that the project is "implementing best practices when it comes to agricultural extension services and has achieved considerable success by targeting individual pilot farmers" 70 . AWF often referred to the mid-term review as proof of success. However, the consultants behind this review merely reproduced the claims and presentations received from AWF and did not make any independent assessments of the farming approach 71 . They did not even visit the project area in Kondoa.
NIRAS conducted the final reviews of the REDD pilot projects. In the case of the Kondoa project, these consultants also reproduced claims about the success of the agricultural component: "According to interviews and project reports, harvesting from sustainable agriculture increased from an average 7 bags to 18-20 bags of maize per acre, thus showing that the approach was effective. On average 1,600 farmers adopted the new practices annually" 72 .
Nevertheless, the NIRAS report found that the recommendation from the baseline study by Mung'ong'o et al. of applying a pro-poor approach had not been followed 73 , and the report remarked that the project had not accurately monitored adoption rates of the agricultural component in the villages 74 .
The implementation of the agricultural component
From the success presentations of the project, we got the impression that the agricultural component was implemented in all the villages from the first project year and with a good backing of extension personnel to guide farmers with the use of new cultivation methods for three years. We discovered, however, that the agricultural component was given limited support and resources.
In each REDD village, twelve demonstration farmers were allocated inputs for a one-acre field for only one growing season, with only one day of training 75 .
Thereafter, the demonstration farmers hardly received any further advise. For the first year (2010-2011) 76 , participation in the agricultural component was restricted to five villages. In the second year, the demonstration farmers in these villages received inputs for only one test plot of an acre to farm together. After expressing dissatisfaction with this arrangement, they received inputs for a quarter of an acre for the third year.
In the second growing season (2011-2012), the demonstration farmers of another nine villages were provided with one day of training and inputs for test plots of one acre each. The following year they received further inputs from the project for a quarter of an acre. In the third growing season (2012-2013), demonstration farmers in the last seven villages received one day of training. One of the villages in this group could not participate in the test, because the rainy season was over when inputs were made available. In the other six villages, the test farmers participated with one acre each.
In March 2014, we were informed by AWF that they had taken over the implementation of the agricultural component from SARI. Being a conservation organisation, their competence to advise farmers on agricultural techniques is limited. Furthermore, AWF's follow-up of the agricultural component mostly took place when they combined it with other tasks, such as field visits with guests from other REDD projects.
We heard many complaints and expressions of disappointment from demonstration farmers about the organisation of the agricultural component. They initially complained about delays in receiving the seeds and other promised inputs. This implied that many were not able to start sowing at the best time. Some received the seeds in time, while the other inputs came too late. Several demonstration farmers also said they felt cheated, because in addition to delays in receiving inputs in the first farming season, they had thought they would be given all the inputs for three years, while they only received supplies for one. Furthermore, they had expected to be advised by agricultural experts, but after the one day of training they were left on their own.
Hence, interviews with demonstration farmers gave us a different picture than the success claims about the agricultural project component. There were substantial flaws and problems in the deliveries of agricultural inputs, and the extension support included only limited training and supervision. Moreover, most claims refer to increases in yields among demonstration farmers in the only year when they were in the exceptional situation of receiving free inputs, such as seeds, chemical fertilisers and pesticides.
The agricultural project component is clearly insufficient to compensate for the negative livelihood impacts caused by the enclosure of the forest. While the forest was enclosed in the beginning of the project period, the agricultural activities started much later. For instance, for the last group of villages the agricultural tests with demonstration farmers started in 2012-2013.
At the same time as effective measures were taken to enclose the forest, a delimited and poorly organised effort was made to teach conservation agriculture to a few farmers in each village. Even if the chosen approach of agricultural modernisation had been suitable to fully compensate everyone for livelihood losses, it would have required much larger efforts and funding. And as compensation for forest enclosure, it would have needed to be implemented for all villagers who had lost forest access from the moment the forest was actually enclosed.
Overlaps with other AWF projects and a government programme
We found that only part of what has been presented as outcomes of the REDD project was actually funded by this project. In parallel to the REDD project, other similar activities of agricultural modernisation were funded by other donors as well as by the Tanzanian state. First and foremost, there are state-based institutions and initiatives to enhance the productivity of small-scale farmers in Tanzania. At the ward level for instance, there are extension officers employed to support and advise villagers about how to modernise their farming methods.
As a result of this extension work in particular, farmers interviewed said they had been familiar for many years with the approach of agricultural modernisation promoted by the REDD project. Extension officers in districts and wards as well as SARI had propagated the same approach through test plots, which in Tanzania are well known as shamba darasa. As mentioned earlier, some of the techniques promoted by the project do actually have a long history in the district. Therefore, many interviewees remarked that the approach of the REDD project and earlier advise received from extension officers were more or less the same.
Moreover, in some of the villages farmers could also receive subsidised fertilisers from the National Agricultural Input Voucher System (NAIVS) established by the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives in 2008. This programme makes each household in a village entitled to one bag of basic fertilisers and one bag of "top dressing" to cover one acre of cultivated land 77 . During 2008-2013, about 300 million USD were invested in providing more than 2.5 million smallholders with a discounts of 50% on corn or rice seed as well as on chemical fertilisers 78 . Hence, demonstration farmers might also receive subsidies for some inputs through NAIVS in addition to the support from the REDD project. We also found, however, that it was unclear how many farmers in each village were provided with government subsidies on seeds and fertilisers, and how many of these were test farmers of the REDD project or others who had adopted agricultural modernisation methods.
After a while, we discovered that when we asked questions about whether villagers had adopted the new farming methods of the REDD project, many seemed not to be aware of where the support came from. In addition to the overlaps between the REDD project and government efforts, we discovered that during the period of the Norwegian funded REDD project (January 2010 to December 2014), AWF received funding for two other projects in the same villages with a substantial component of agricultural modernisation. One was a USAID project called "Scaling up Conservation and Livelihoods Efforts in Northern Tanzania" (SCALE-TZ) with a funding of USD 9,2 million during January 2010 to November 2014. The project aimed to increase household income and improve conservation in the TarangireManyara and the Kilimanjaro-Natron ecosystems 79 .
We were told by AWF that SCALE-TZ provided agricultural inputs for the first two farming seasons, while the third and last round of inputs were funded by REDD 80 .
AWF has, however, communicated the combined results from the two projects to the Norwegian embassy as results of the REDD project alone.
Furthermore, through EuropeAid, the European Union funds a project called "Enhancing Livelihoods through PFM in Northern Tanzania" also through AWF 81 .
This is a four-year project of EUR 1 million from December 2012 to December 2016. The project overlaps considerably with the agricultural element as well as other project elements of the REDD project in the villages around the Kondoa-Irangi Hills.
In the project description, however, the agricultural component is not called "conservation agriculture", but "sustainable agriculture". AWF explained to us that these labels are "just different words for the same" 82 .
In February 2015, at the European Union (EU) office in Dar es Salaam we were told about the demonstration farms and the successes with the increases in crop yields in the EU project in Kondoa. The EU official interviewed had visited the project area for two days with AWF as a guide. He was enthusiastic about the results of the EU project, and especially the agricultural component, which he saw as its greatest success:
"It works wonders. You should talk with the villagers there, and they will tell you themselves. They are so happy about the project. We also talked with people who did not have a demonstration farm, but had already adapted the techniques, and they are also so happy. So I think that is one of the positive parts of the project" 83 .
As shown above, the three projects funded by the Norwegian embassy, USAID and EU overlap to a large extent, both geographically and in content, primarily through their emphasis on enhancing crop yields by introducing high-yielding seeds, fertilisers and pesticides. In addition, part of the support for this agricultural programme has been covered by the Tanzanian government. Such overlaps could of course be seen as positive synergies rather than a problem. It seems almost impossible, however, to single out the benefits of the REDD project in this context compared to those of the other sources of funding. Nevertheless, the agricultural component of the REDD project has been argued by AWF and the Norwegian embassy to compensate for the negative livelihood effects of the enclosure of the forest, although there is no documentation of the actual contribution of the REDD project.
Risks of an input-intensive agricultural approach
Several farmers interviewed expressed scepticism about adopting the inputintensive approach promoted by the REDD project, because they feared it would be too risky. For instance, two farmers in "Kijiji 3" said this approach was likely to lead to high yields if everything went well. Since inputs are expensive, however, farmers will have to borrow money, and with unpredictable rainfall there is a risk of crop failure. Based on the expensive inputs, they therefore calculated the risks to be too high to take. Another example is a married couple in "Kijiji 1" who told us that they were reluctant to adopt the approach because of its high risks involving buying seeds, fertilisers and pesticides.
The risks involved in accepting the agricultural package promoted would be higher for the poorest farmers. This implies that many of these villagers are likely to choose not to adopt the agricultural modernisation proposed by the REDD project and will therefore not be able to benefit from this livelihood component, contrary to claims made by the Norwegian embassy and AWF. On the other hand, those who choose to adopt this approach may become more exposed to risks of crop failure or fluctuating prices on crops or production inputs.
Explaining the success of the success narrative Safeguards such as doing no harm and poverty reduction have played a key role in the REDD discourse. Our findings do, however, show that the REDD project in Kondoa, which is highlighted as a great success by the main actors, has been implemented in a way that has not taken measures to avoid harm for the poor and vulnerable parts of the population. The agricultural component is presented by the project funders and implementers as a successful form of compensation for lost forest access. We found, however, that this claim lacks evidence. In addition, the techniques promoted are not new and the funding also came from two other externally funded projects and the Tanzanian government in addition to the REDD project. So, given the poor evidence, how can the success of the success narrative be explained?
During more than ten years, David Mosse followed closely a UK funded rural aid project in western India as a consultant 84 . He points at how different actors have had interests in contributing to the representation of the project as successful. Mosse also draws the attention to how policy changes -and thereby discourse changes -in the donor country may change the image of a project from success to failure. In the Kondoa case, however, the policy and discourse around REDD have remained stable in the donor country Norway during the project period, and the success narrative of the Kondoa project has also been stable.
In the case presented by Mosse, the first years were not only narrated as successful, but there was also strong documentation of goal achievements. This contrasts the REDD project in Kondoa where we have found a serious mismatch between narrative and evidence from an early stage.
In line with Mosse, the first element in our explanation provides a focus on actors who for various reasons see it as in their interests to produce a success narrative. Following Chapin 85 and Büscher 86 , an image of success in conservation and development aid depends on successful marketing. We have shown how success has been marketed by the AWF, the Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam and some local actors in the project area.
Second, is is necessary to recognise that there are interests at group as well as individual level of establishing a success narrative. By an image of success, organizations such as AWF may make it easier for themselves to get new projects funded by donors. Chapin 87 argues that large international NGOs market their projects in similar ways as multinational corporations. For individuals in these organisations, success narratives may secure jobs as well as improve competitiveness in the general employment market.
Furthermore, when the Norwegian Embassy has promoted the Kondoa case as successful, this has been an important element in the embassy's demonstration of its successful implementation of REDD, which since 2007 has constituted a central element of the Norwegian government's climate change mitigation policy.
Moreover, embassies in charge of large aid budgets are subject to a high disbursement pressure -the so-called "pipeline problem" -implying that individual officials need to make sure that aid money is spent by the end of the financial year. The anthropologist Eirik Jansen has retired from a long career in Norwegian aid management, and he has written an article based on experiences as a programme officer at the Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam 2003 Salaam -2007 "The 'successful' programme officer would be a person who managed the programmes well in an administrative technical sense, signed agreements and made disbursement on time, reporting back to Norway on progress. There was a strong administrative culture emphasizing the need to 'do things right'. The main incentives in the system leading to a successful career seemed to be to master and follow the administrative rules laid down." 88 Thus, programme officers are concerned about disbursements in time to foster personal careers. Any complications that might impede these disbursements may be seen as unnecessary noise.
Third, we have shown examples of how some villagers and village leaders seem to have interpreted the project and marketing of its success as being in their own interest, while others have taken contrary positions. When the project has been presented by AWF and the embassy, some of the actors who have benefited get to play their roles in order to communicate a general picture of success.
Fourth, the success of the success narrative is also a result of the lack of structures to ensure that critical examinations of the interventions are conducted by independent evaluators and researchers. Consultants who have evaluated the project have had very limited time frames and resources available, and they have even hardly been able to visit any of the projects evaluated. 89 The Norwegian REDD activities in Tanzania did, however, contain a research programme, which was called "Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation and Mitigation" (CCIAM). But, as participants in CCIAM ourselves, we experienced that the funding provided for each project was too small to enable critical investigation. It was only after receiving extra funding from our own institutions combined with a new substantial project from the Research Council of Norway, that we were able to spend enough time on the case study 90 . Thus, we found CCIAM to serve as a legitimation of the interventions by giving the impression of a substantial involvement of researchers, while not providing the necessary resources to carry out in-depth studies.
In February 2015 when a delegation of Norwegian parliamentarians visited Dar es Salaam, the embassy organised a meeting to learn about impacts of NICFI/REDD in Tanzania. There were presentations of pilot projects from NGOs who facilitated the projects. One of us was going to be in Dar es Salaam at the time, and asked the embassy for permission to attend. This request was turned down. In this way, the embassy staff safeguarded its success story and managed to control the information communicated to Norwegian MPs.
Finally, success narratives are demanded by promoters of the multi-win REDD discourse. Based on a study of REDD in Tanzania, Lund et al. hold REDD to be "the latest in a long row of conservation fads" and where "the promise of change becomes a discursive commodity that is constantly reproduced and used to generate value and appropriate financial resources" 91 . The "success" of REDD in this perspective is not about realising goals, but that promises of the policy model of REDD are shared in "epistemic communities" and with policy making and financial support as results. 92 Lund et al. 93 argue that in Tanzania the large recent spending on REDD has followed a previous conservation fad of Participatory Forest Management (PFM). The history of environmental interventions in Kondoa demonstrates how the REDD project discussed here constitutes an element in a long series of such fads. Paradoxically, even though the project was a pilot project, it was apparently more important for actors behind it to produce and reproduce a success narrative rather than to learn from experiences. The only way the project can turn into a real success, is if the counternarrative that we have substantiated in this article contributes to considerable policy changes for donors of conservation and development such as Norway.
Notes

